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Abstract 
 
This research aims to explains association between financial expertise of directors to directors compensation and 
directors turnover of Indonesia non financial company in 2011-2012. Using ordinary least square regression we 
used four variables to define financial expertise of directors: age of the directors, tenure of the directors, the post-
graduate degree (MBA), and the accounting certification (CPA). However, this study found no association 
financial expertise to compensation and directors turnover. We hope this study can contributes to financial 
expertise, compensation, and turnover literature. We also provide implications for companies in determining the 
compensation of directors based on financial expertise. Further research can be improve by add new variabel 
such as complexcity and board size. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Begins with sarbanes oxley act 2002 that signed 
in chicago, an important role director and chief 
financial officer became the most topic discussed. One 
of the mai contents of Sarbanes Oxley Act is to 
require CEO and CFO to certify the validity of 
financial reporting(Suradi, 2012). 
 
The purpose of creating financial statements is to 
generate information became useful information for 
making decisions. In preparing the financial 
statements, Indonesia adopted the new standard of 
GAAP to IFRS. Indonesia is gradually adopting IFRS. 
Starting from 2008 until 2011 as transition period of 
period, and full adopted IFRS in 2012. 
 
This research will use 2011 and 2012 as research 
year. In that year all members of the board of directors 
are in the same position, where the directors must be 
able to understand, apply and provide training to 
members in implementing the new standards. In this 
position, the board of directors can provide expertise 
in applying new standards, so financial expertise of 
directors becomes the key of preparing accurate 
financial statements for the year. 
 
The existence of Sarbanes oxley act has enhanced 
research related to the role of the directors on the quality 
of financial statements. Loyeung (2014) examines the 
relationship between the financial director's accounting 
talents, compensation and change of finance director. 
Woning (2014) examines the relationship between the 
complexity of the work of the finance director to the 
compensation and performance of the finance director. 
Burks (2007) examines the relationship between the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act's impact on re-reporting and 
compensation of the chief and financial directors. Sun 
(2015) examines the relationship between accounting 
expert financial finance (CFO's financial expertise) and 
concerns about corporate governance. Darmadi (2013) 
examines the effect of board member education on 
corporate performance in developing countries such as 
Indonesia. 
 
This research is an extension of Loyeung's 
previous research (2014) which examines the financial 
director's accounting talents, compensation of finance 
 
 
director, and director’s turnover. This study differs 
from previous research in several respects. First, this 
research is conducted in Indonesia which is one of the 
developing Asian countries. Second, this study uses 
financial expertise as an independent variable. Third, 
previous research focused on financial director (CFO) 
while in this study focused on the board of directors. 
 
Our study is important in the following ways. 
First, this research is interesting because there is still 
little literature and discussion that discuss about 
financial expertise especially in Indonesia. Secondly, 
this topic becomes very interesting because of the 
growing issue of Sarbanes Oxley Act or commonly 
known by the acronym SOX / SOA and the change of 
accounting standards in Indonesia. This study entitled 
the influence of financial accounting of directors to 
compensation and directors turnover in non-financial 
companies in Indonesia. 
 
1.2 Formulation of the problem  
This study aims to examine the effect of financial 
expertise of directors on compensation and directors 
turnover in Indonesia. This study provides the literary 
benefit for the development theory because of the lack of 
literature on financial expertise, directors compensation 
and change of directors in Indonesia. In addition, for the 
research company it can be useful for practitioners in 
applying compensation and change of directors by 
considering financial expertise of directors. 
 
1.3 Research purposes 
 
This study aims to develop Loyeung's previous 
research (2014). This study aims to examine the effect 
of fianancial expertise of directors on compensation 
and director’s turnover in Indonesia. This research is 
expected to give a new evidance for the financial 
expertise literature and give different results because 
it’s done in developing countries. 
 
1.4 Benefits of research 
 
This research provides the literary benefit for the 
development of theory because of the lack of literature 
on financial expertise, directors compensation and 
directors turnover in Indonesia. In addition to this 
research company can be useful for practitioners in 
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 applying compensation and change of directors by 
considering fianancial expertise of directors. 
 
2. Theoretical Review 
 
2.1 Theoritical review 
 
Agency Theory 
 
When owner hires another party to perform a 
service in his compeny, there is an interest conflict 
with the related party. The owner of the entity is the 
principal and the other party employed is referred to 
as the agent. In performing its duties the principal 
delegates the authorization of decision-making in the 
hands of the agent. In a company, the shareholder as 
the principal and the chief executive as the agent. At 
the lower level the chief executive becomes principal 
and the manager of the business unit becomes his 
agent (Anthony, 2005). 
 
The agency theory assumes that all individuals 
act for their own interests. Agents are assumed to 
receive job satisfaction not only from financial 
compensation but also from additional directly 
involved in agency relations (Anthony, 2005). In this 
theory is known as agency problems. An agent is 
more likely to prioritize its interests compared with 
the interests of business or shareholders (Muharam, 
2004). Therefore principal will provide compensation 
as a form of positive motivation to the agent. 
 
2.2 Research Accomplished 
 
The discussion of the relationship between 
principal and agents has become a very interesting and 
contentious topic. Beginning with the Enron, WorldCom, 
and other multinational case scandals, has sparked 
regulatory reforms related to agency responsibilities in 
reporting their corporate finances. Following the 
emergence of related scandals The responsibility of the 
agent in reporting the company's finances comes the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or SOX / SOA regulation. This 
regulation contains provisions that one of them is the 
agents, especially the chief executive (CEO) and the 
financial director (CFO), must have accountable 
accounting principles. This sparked a lot of debate that 
assume that in carrying out its duties, a 
 
 
director must have talent or mastery in accounting. Burks 
(2007) investigated the impact of SOX and 
 
re-reporting on compensation and replacement of CEOs 
and CFOs. Berks (2007) found no significant association 
between CEO turnover to re-reporting after SOX, but 
there was a significant relationship between CEO 
turnover to SOX re-reporting. This supports that SOX 
rules that require the CEO and CFO to have accounting 
qualifications in financial reporting. 
 
Loyeung (2014) examined the relationship 
between CFO accounting talents on compensation and 
CFO turnover. In his research, Loyeung (2014) took 
accounting reporting error levels at the turn of US 
GAAP to IFRS as a measure of accounting talent 
variables. Loyeung (2014) found that there was a 
positive relationship Between CFO accounting talents 
on CFO compensation during IFRS transition period 
and during IFRS full adoption period. In addition 
Loyeung (2014) finds there is an inverse relationship 
between CFO accounting talents on CFO turnover in 
the transition year and full adoption years. 
 
Colli et.al (2016) examines the Earning 
Restatement, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and the 
Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers. Colli et.al 
(2016) examines the relation of earnings reporting and 
the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on the disciplinary 
director of finance.Colli et . (2016) used a change of 
financial director as a result of the disciplinary action of 
the finance director.Colli et.al (2016) found that after the 
issuance of SOX regulations the finance director was 
more severe in making earnings reports than in the pre-
SOX period. .al (2016) is the financial director asked to 
have more financial expertise to account for the report. 
 
Sun et.al (2014) examines CFO financial 
expertise and corporate governance concerns 
Evidence from S&P SmallCap 600 Index. Sun (2014) 
investigates the relationship between financial 
director's financial expertise on good corporate 
governance.In Sun's study (2014) CPA (Certificate 
Public Accountant), MBA (Master of Business 
Administration), tenure and age of finance director as 
a measurement tool to measure financial expertise. 
Sun (2014) found that negatively accounting skills of 
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 finance director related to Concerns good 
governance.That is, in his research accounting skills 
of finance director can reduce the concerns of good 
corporate governance principles.This led investors to 
become confident with the company and lack of 
supervision from investors. 
 
Woning (2014) examines the effect of job 
complexity and performance of financial director on 
compensation of finance director. Woning research 
(2014) conducted in Indonesia. Woning (2014) uses 
company size, business segment, free cash flow, and 
long-term debt as a proxy to measure the complexity 
of work.And using the positive accrual discretionary, 
growth opportunities and age of the finance director to 
measure the performance of finance director.From the 
results of his research, woning 2014) found that the 
compensation of the finance director only had an 
effect on one of the measurement of the complexity of 
the work ie firm size, as well as the effect on one of 
the performance measures ie growth opportunities. 
CFO compensation has no effect on business 
segments, free cash flow, long-term debt, positive 
accrual discretionary, and CFO age. 
 
Darmadi (2013) examines the effect of board of 
director's education on company performance in 
Indonesia. Darmadi (2013) uses the proportion of 
CPA and postgraduate degrees that the board has as a 
proxy to measure the education of directors. In 
addition Darmadi (2013) separates the education of 
directors by dividing it into overseas graduates and 
graduates in the country. Darmadi (2013) found that 
directors with educational qualifications showed 
better performance than those without qualifications. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
IFRS is the biggest innovation in world of accounting. 
IFRS is considered able to add more comprehensive 
information quality than GAAP in accounting reporting 
(Krismiaji, 2016). Indonesia as a developing country 
started gradually in adopting IFRS. Started in 2008 and 
full adoption in 2012. The process of changing from 
GAAP to IFRS is increase demands for board of 
directors to learn new standards and take responsible in 
 
 
staff training, users, analysts, creditors, and investors. 
The impact of a error in adapting GAAP to IFRS is 
considered be an indicator of accounting talent 
(Loyeung, 2014). 
 
The accuracy of accounting reporting becomes the 
standard of information quality conveyed. Supriharin 
(2013) proves that IFRS adoption can improve the 
relevance of equity and profit values against stock prices. 
In process of adopting IFRS, the increase value in the 
financial statements is considered as a key to success 
level in implementing the new standards. This success 
level is can be evidence of the existence of financial 
expertise. Board directors with financial expertise are 
expected to be better implement new financial standards 
than directors who do not have financial expertise. In 
accordance with the idea that directors who have 
successfully implemented IFRS in the transitional year 
will receive greater compensation compared to the less 
successful directors of IFRS, the first hypothesis will 
show as follows: 
 
H1. There is positive association between the 
director’s financial expertise and director’s 
compensation level in transistion years. 
 
Board of directors usually hired between 3 to 5 
years. One component in compensation usually 
consists of base pay and bonuses. Annual increases in 
basic salaries are usually determined on the basis of 
employment contracts. Therefore, in his research 
Loyeung (2014) did not expect a significant increase 
in total compensation from the transition year to the 
full adoption year. However, board of directors who 
has better peformance will get a higher bonus 
(Loyeung, 2014). Bonus is a component that exists in 
total compensation. This will build the second 
hypothesis that the company will provide bonuses and 
raise greater compensation to board of directors with 
financial expertise than less financial expertise. 
Therefore, board of directors with financial expertise 
will receive a greater compensation increase from the 
company compared to the less financial expertise. 
 
H2. There is positive association between the director’s 
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 financial expertise and increase of director’s 
compensation level in adoption years. 
 
The lack of financial expertise can cause weak 
 
internal control of the company. Companies with weak 
 
internal controls which get lower compensation and 
 
experience will more frequent in board turnover (Wang, 
 
2010). This is similar with Loyeung's (2014), time of 
 
IFRS adoption is considered as momentum of a change 
 
in accounting standards. During the adoption period the 
 
directors are considered be in the same situation and 
 
are expected to implement the new standards better. 
 
Directors who have no expertise in applying new 
 
standards are likely to be replaced (Colli, 2016). This 
 
builds a third hypothesis, the board of directors with 
 
financial expertise will be able to implement the new 
 
standards and will be maintained by the company 
 
compared to the board of directors without the 
financial expertise. 
 
H3. There is negative association between the 
 
director’s financial expertise and director’s turnover in 
 
transistion years. 
 
 
 
4. Research Methods 
 
4.1 Population and Sample 
 
This research is a quantitative research whose data 
 
obtained  through  financial  statements  and  annual 
 
reports  of  non-financial  companies  listed  on  the 
 
Indonesian stock exchanges. Samples will select on 
 
purposive sampling as follows: 
 
 Table 1 Sample Characteristics    
     
 Non-financial companies listed on IDX 2011 and 2012 235 
 Less :   
 Do not have complete annual report 56 
 Using foreign currency 33 
 Not explaining the profile of the board of directors 64 
 Does not contain directors' compensation 31 
 Total sample hypotheses 1, 2, 3  51  
 
The population that includes non-financial 
companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2011 and 
2012 are 253 companies. After selecting samples, 
there are 51 companies that meet the characteristics of 
sample. This research was conducted in Indonesia and 
used a sample of non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesian stock exchange. Previous research was 
conducted in Europe, America and Australia. This 
research was conducted in Indonesia which is a 
developing country. Indonesiais different from 
previous research, it is hoped this research can add to 
the evidence of the influence of financial expertise on 
compensation and change of directors in developing 
countries. 
 
4.2 Types and Sources of Data  
The types and sources of data used in this study 
is secondary and historical data, so in the data 
collection techniques using data base collection 
techniques. Database retrieval technique is done to 
obtain secondary archive data. In this research, data 
archive technique obtained from the official website 
of Indonesia stock exchange. We collect data 
 
through historical data by accessing the official site 
of the Indonesian stock exchange. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Technique  
Sampling technique using non-random 
sampling method is purposive judgment sampling 
or sampling using special criteria. The purpose of 
this method is to take samples based on specific 
criteria based on certain considerations. purposive 
judgment sampling to avoid the imbalance of data 
between years to be studied. 
Samples taken must meet certain criteria.First 
sample must be non-financial companies because for 
financial companies there are different composition in 
financial reporting. Secondly, the sample must have 
complete financial information in its financial 
statements. Third, the sample must have data on the 
members of the board of directors ranging from name, 
title, term of office, and total amount of compensation 
to the board of directors. Fourth, the sample must be 
listed on the Indonesian stock exchanges in the two 
years studied ie the transition year 2011 and the year 
of full adoption 2012.  
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4.4 Research Model and Variables Measurment 
This study will use multiple regression model.  
Here is a multiple regression model that will be 
used to test the first and second hypothesis. 
 
Model Hipotesis 1: 
 
COMPt = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA+ β3 TENURE + 
β4 AGE + β5 SIZE……...(1) 
 
Model Hipotesis 2: 
 
∆COMPt+1 = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA+ β3 
TENURE + β4 AGE + β5 SIZE……...(2) 
 
COMPt :Total of board direstors compensation in 
transition year (2011) 
∆COMPt+1 : Boards directors compensation increase 
In adoption year (2012)  
CPA :Proportion of Board directors Certified 
professional accountant. 
MBA :Proportion of magister Bussiness 
administration. 
TENURE :Proportion of year service of directors 
AGE :Proportion of directors age 
SIZE :Size of company 
 
To test hypothesis 3, this study will use logistic 
regression model. Here is a logistic regression model 
that will be used to test the third hypothesis. 
 
Model Hipotesis 3: 
 
TURNOVER = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA + β3 
TENURE + β4 AGE + β5 SIZE + ɛ 
….………(3) 
 
TURNOVERt+1:Directors turnover in adoption year. 
CPA :Proportion of Board directors 
 Certified professional accountant. 
MBA :Proportion of magister Bussiness 
 administration.   
TENURE :Proportion  of  year  service  of 
 directors    
AGE :Proportion of directors age 
SIZE :Size of company  
 
 
Operational Variables  
Dependent Variables 
Directors' Compensation 
Compensation is all income in the form of 
money, goods directly or indirectly received by 
employees in return for services. Woning (2014) 
uses log of total compensatin as a proxy for 
compensation. Ulupui (2015) examines the effect of 
family ownership, directors & commissioners' 
 
closeness to the controlling owners of the 
compensation of directors and company 
commissioners in the Indonesian capital market 
also using log of total compensation as a proxy of 
compensation. In accordance with the previous 
research, this study will also use the natural log of 
the total compensation of the directors as the proxy 
of the directors compensation variable. 
 
Compensation Increase.  
Loyeung (2014) finds that the company will 
provide bonuses for and greater compensation 
increases to directors who successfully implement 
new financial standards in the company. Bonus is one 
of the components in compensation. A bonus increase 
will result in an increase in total compensation 
received by the board of directors. The increase in 
compensation will be measured using the difference in 
total compensation in 2012 and 2011. 
 
Directors’ Turnover  
The board of directors is the person responsible 
for company. Board of commissioners entrust 
decision-making to the board of directors. The board 
of commissioners prefer board of directors who 
understand in accounting because in preparing and 
analyzing financial statements requires financial 
expertise (Zhao, 2016). Previous studies have argued 
that directors with poor accounting skills and error in 
reporting earnings are more often superseded by 
skilled directors. Substitution of the board of directors 
can be seen the company's annual report.  
The proxy for directors’ turnover shall be 
measured by directors’ turnover. Directors’s 
turnover is measured by matching the names of the 
board of directors in 2011 and 2012. If there is a 
change it will be given a value of one and if there is 
no change it will be given a value of zero. 
 
Independent Variaebel  
Financial expertise 
The independent variable of this research is 
financial expertise (financial expertise) were measured 
using the proportion of professional certification (CPA) 
board of directors, the proportion of post-graduate 
degree (MBA) board of directors, the directors working 
period (tenure) and ages of directors. If directors have 
accounting professional qualification (CPA) and post-
graduate degree (MBA) then rated one and if not then 
given a zero value for each variable. Then the value of 
the accounting professional qualification (CPA) will be 
totaled and divided by the number of existing board 
members. The same thing applies to the variable 
glasses graduate (MBA). The tenure of the directors 
(tenure) will be measured by using a long-serving 
company and the age of the directors will be measured 
using the proportion of the age of the board of 
directors.  
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 Variable Control  
Company size 
To support the research, this study used a 
control variable. The control variables used are the 
size of the company that will be measured using a 
natural log total assets (TA). Company size 
measured by total fixed assets and current assets 
acquired from the company's financial statements. 
Total assets have been frequently used as a measure 
of the size of the company in several studies. 
Companies that have a large size is more interested 
in hiring the director mememiliki keahlian.Selain 
large-sized enterprise is deemed better able to 
provide a great compensation to the board of 
directors (Loyeung, 2014). 
 
 
5. Results And Discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics  
Based on the second table of descriptive 
statistics can know the number of samples to be 
tested as many as 51 companies. From the table of 
descriptive statistics can be seen in total 
compensation in 2011 have an average value of 
22.242, 18.5 maximum value, minimum value of 
25.9 and a standard deviation of 1.4803. Total 
compensation in 2012 have an average value of 
22.534, 26.3 maximum value and minimum value of  
19.7, and a standard deviation of 1.4447. 
The increase in the compensation of directors 
has an average value of 20.524, the maximum value 
of 25, the minimum value of 16.6, and a standard 
deviation of 1.9655. Substitution of directors has an 
average value of 0.451, the maximum value of 1, 
the minimum value of 0 and a standard deviation of 
 
0.5025. Age of directors in 2011 have an average 
value of 47.778 years, the maximum of 61.3 years, 
the minimum value of 30 and a standard deviation 
of 5.5558. Age of directors in 2012 have an average 
value of 48.098 years, the maximum of 62.3 years, 
35.5 years minimum value, and a standard 
deviation of 5.5426.  
Period servant of directors in 2011 have an 
average value of 5,218 years, the maximum value of 
25.7 years, the minimum value 0 years, and the 
standard deviation of 5.4008. Period servant of 
directors in 2012 have an average value of 5.147 
years, 26.7 years maximum value, minimum value 0 
years, and the standard deviation of 4.9897. 
Accounting certification in 2011 have an average 
value of 0,020, the maximum 4, the minimum value of 
0 and a standard deviation of 0.745. Accounting 
certification in 2012 have an average value of 0.019, 
the maximum value of 3, the minimum value of 0 and 
a standard deviation of 0.709. Post-graduate degree in 
2011 have an average value of 0,302, the maximum 
value of 1, the minimum value of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 0,2590.Gelar graduate in 2012 have an 
average value of 0.331, the maximum value of 1, the 
minimum value 0, and standard deviation of 0.2301. 
 
Total compensation of directors and directors 
using the nominal rupiah rise in full so as to simplify 
the data so that the data to be normal by using the 
natural logarithm. For ages directors and a man of 
directors using the unit of money later in proporsikan 
with the number of board members. accounting 
certification and post-graduate degree using a 
proportion of the number of members who have 
accounting certification and post-graduate degree. 
 
 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Research Model    
   N  Min  Max   mean  Std. deviation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
COMP_t  51 18.5 25.9  22.242 1.4803 
COMP_ti 51 19.7 26.3  22.534 1.4447 
Ln_∆COMP 51 16.6 25.0  20.524 1.9655 
Turnover 51 0,00 1.0  .451 .5025 
AGE_t 51 30.0 61.3  47.778 5.5558 
AGE_ti 51 35.5 62.3  48.098 5.5426 
TENURE_t 51 0,00 25.7  5,218 5.4008 
TENURE_ti 51 0,00 26.7  5.147 4.9897 
CPA_t 51 0,00 0.4  0,020 .0745 
CPA_ti 51 0,00 0.3  0,019 .0709 
MBA_t 51 0,00 1.0  0,302 .2590 
MBA_ti 51 0,00 1.0  0.331 .2301 
Size_t 51 23.7 32.3  28.266 1.7093  
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  SIZE_ti 51 23.8 32.3 28.327 1.6764  
            
 Source: SPSS 17.0           
 First Hypothesis Testing Results (H1) expertise of directors having an effect positively to  
 The first hypothesis in this study is the financial the compensation of directors in transition (2011).  
   Table 3 Results of regression test the first hypothesis    
   Dependent Variable = Compensation of Directors in 2011   
           
 variables  Regression coefficient    t Count  Sig  
 constants 6.825     2.218 0,032  
 AGE_t -0.011     -0.327 0,745  
 TENURE_t 0,008     .227 0.821  
 CPA_t -1.926     -0.824 0,414  
 MBA_t 0,848     1,249 0.218  
 size_t 0.555     5.227 0,000  
 adjusted R2       0.352  
 Regression        0,000  
 Observation       51  
            
 Source: SPSS 17.0            
 
Based on Table 3 the results of multiple 
regression test the first hypothesis, the value of the 
adjusted R2 of 0.352 which means that the 
variability of the compensation of directors in 2011 
can be explained by 35.2% by the age variable 
directors, past the man of directors, the accounting 
profession degree (CPA), and the title of the post 
bachelor (MBA) directors in 2011. the remaining 
64.8% is explained by other variables not included 
in the regression model.  
Under the influence of the simultaneous test (F 
test) was obtained calculated F value of 6,428 and 
0,000 levels in the regression sinifikansi smaller 
than 0.05, which means that the independent 
variable financial expertise simultaneously affect 
variable compensation. However, financial expertise 
can simultaneously affect the variable compensation 
due to the directors of the significance of the size of 
the company tingtat 0,000 less than 0,005. If the 
record per variable, the variable age of directors 
(Age) significant at 0.745, Variable time servant of 
directors (Tenure) is significant at 0.821, CPA 
variables significant at 0,414, and an MBA variables 
significant at 0.218. The fourth significant value 
financial expertise variable value is greater than 
0.05, so there is no variable financial expertise that 
can simultaneously affect the variable compensation 
of directors. The first hypothesis is not supported. 
Based on the partial test (t test) output results of the 
regression test first hypothesis can be inferred by 
the regression equation as follows: 
 
KOMPt = 6.825 to 1.926 CPA + 0,848 MBA + 0,008 
TENURE - 0,011 AGE + 0.555 SIZE 
 
 
The constant of 6.825 states that if the 
independent variables held constant, the total 
compensation of directors at 6.825. CPA negative 
regression coefficient 1.296, which means every 
variable CPA up one unit will reduce the 
compensation of directors amounted to 1,926 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. MBA worth positive regression 
coefficient 0.848, which means every variable 
MBA rose one unit will increase the compensation 
of directors amounted to 0,848 with the assumption 
that the other independent variables are fixed.  
Servants period is positive coefficient of 
0.008, which means every time variable servant 
(Tenure) moved up one unit will increase the 
variable compensation of directors amounted to 
0,008 with the assumption that the other 
independent variables are fixed. AGE negative 
regression coefficient of 0.011, which means every 
variable AGE up one unit will reduce the 
compensation of directors amounted to 0,011 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. Regression coefficient of firm size (Size) 
is positive 0.555 means that every variable firm size 
(Size) moved up one unit will increase the variable 
compensation of directors amounted to 0.555 
assuming other independent variables are fixed.  
Of the four variables that define financial 
expertise no positive effect on the variable 
compensation of directors. However, the control 
variables firm size have a significant effect in 
predicting the compensation of directors. This is in 
contrast with previous studies that examined the   
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 financial director of financial expertise to the 
compensation of financial directors in the turn of 
the IFRS transition.  
Loyeung (2014) argues the greater the 
directors serving in his position, the better the 
decisions related to their responsibilities. Nourayi 
(2008) also reported the same thing associated time 
servant (Tenure) and ages of directors (Age) against 
compensation. Post-graduate degree (MBA) 
became one of the accounting variables that have a 
positive influence on the compensation of directors, 
MBA and CPA is used as a measurement of 
financial expertise based on the assumption that 
graduates master the business can provide 
knowledge about the business and also a better 
understanding of the accounting (Sun, 2013).  
However, there are some studies that show 
similar results to the study. Variable age of 
directors (AGE), accounting certification (CPA), 
the directors post-graduate degree (MBA), and a 
man of directors (Tenure) did not show the same 
results in previous studies. Nourayi (2008) found 
the compensation of directors is influenced 
significantly by the performance of directors but is 
not influenced by the length of time the man of the 
board of directors and ages of directors. Guner 
(2008) also found that the compensation of 
directors is not a significant increase to the directors 
who have financial expertise.  
This is because few samples of directors 
members holding accounting certification that the 
sample less representative of the population 
 
accounting for the certification test in this study. 
The same thing happened in post-graduate degree 
(MBA) in which not all members of the board of 
directors holds a post-graduate degree. In addition, 
only 35.2% variable financial expertise can explain 
compensation while the remaining 64.8% is 
explained by other variables not included in the 
financial expertise. From these results, the 
researchers concluded less capacity so that the 
sample variable financial expertise financial 
expertise in Indonesia are less able to explain the 
compensation of directors.  
Principal delegate authority to the directors in 
making decisions. In selecting directors, principals 
would prefer directors who have financial expertise 
and provide compensation as a form of motivation 
to increase profits. However, in this study did not 
show a positive effect of the financial expertise of 
directors of the compensation of directors. This 
study proves that the agency theory only a theory 
and have no effect on the control of management 
practitioners. This proves that the owner of the 
company did not apply the principle of agency in 
determining compensation. 
 
Second Hypothesis Testing Results (H2)  
The second hypothesis in this study is the 
financial expertise of directors (financial expertise) 
positive effect on the increase in the compensation 
of directors in full adoption. 
 
  Table 4 Results of the second hypothesis regression test   
  Dependent Variable = Increase in Compensation of Directors In the Year 2012 
     
variables  Regression coefficient  Sig 
     
constants 1,273 0.754 
AGE_t -0.024 0.615 
TENURE_t -0.022 0.676 
CPA_t 3,853 .227 
MBA_t -0.780 .435 
size_t 0.731 0,000 
adjusted R2   0,365 
Regression   0,000 
     
Observation   51   
Source:SPSS 17.0 
 
Based on Table 4 the results of multiple 
regression test hypotheses Second, the value of the 
adjusted R2 of 0.365 which means that the 
variability of increase in compensation of directors 
in 2012 can be explained by 36.5% by the age 
variable directors, past the man of directors, the 
accounting profession degree (CPA), and the title 
graduate (MBA) directors in 2012. the remaining 
 
63.5% is explained by other variables not included 
in the regression model.  
Under the influence of the simultaneous test (F 
test) was obtained regression significance value of 
0.000 is smaller than 0.05, which means that the 
independent variable financial expertise of directors 
simultaneously together influencing variable 
compensation increases directors (LNΔCOMP).   
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 However, when seen from the significant value of 
each variable financial expertise of directors 
obtained a value as follows. Age of directors (Age) 
has a significant value of 0.615. Period servant of 
directors (Tenure) has a significant value of 0.676. 
Directors accounting certification (CPA) has a 
significant value of 0.227. Directors post-graduate 
degree (MBA) has a significance value of 0.435. As 
for the control variables firm size is 0,000.  
Although the simultaneous test (F test) 
showed the second hypothesis is supported not least 
due to the significance level of firm size (Size) 
0,000 less than 0.05. If the terms of the significance 
value per independent variable age of directors, 
servants past directors, directors accounting 
certification, and post-graduate degree directors 
have a significance value greater than 0.05. Thus, 
we can conclude the second hypothesis is not 
supported. That is, the financial expertise of 
directors positive effect on the increase in the 
compensation of directors in full adoption. 
Based on the partial test (t test) results of the 
second hypothesis regression test output can be 
concluded with a regression equation as follows: 
 
ΔKOMP = 1,273 + 3,853 CPA - 0.780 MBA - 0,022 
TENURE - 0,024 AGE + 0, 731 SIZE 
 
The constant of 1.273 states that if the 
independent variables held constant, the increase in 
the compensation of directors amounted to 1,273. 
CPA regression coefficient is worth 3,853, which 
means every variable CPA up one unit will increase 
the directors compensation increase of 3.835 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. MBA worth the regression coefficient - 
0.780, which means every variable MBA rose one 
unit will reduce the increase in the compensation of 
directors amounted to 0.780 with the assumption 
that the other independent variables are fixed.  
Time servant negative coefficient 0.022, which 
means every time variable servant (Tenure) moved up 
one unit will lower variable compensation increases of 
directors of 0.022 assuming that the other independent 
variables are fixed. AGE negative regression 
coefficient of 0.024, which means every variable AGE 
up one unit will reduce the increase in compensation 
of directors amounted to 0,024 with the assumption 
that the other independent variables are 
tetap.Koefesien regression firm size (Size) is positive 
0.731 means that every variable firm size (Size) ride 
one unit will increase the variable compensation 
increases with the assumption of directors amounted 
to 0.731 other independent variables are fixed. 
 
Control variables significant effect of firm size 
in predicting the increase in variable compensation 
of directors but not financial expertise of directors. 
 
This is not in line with previous studies that 
examined the financial expertise to the financial 
director compensation increases or bonuses finance 
director in pergatian adoption of IFRS (Loyeung, 
2014).  
Of the four variables that define financial 
expertise accounting certification (CPA), a 
postgraduate degree (MBA), the age of the 
directors (Age), and a man of directors (Tenure) no 
positive effect on the variable compensation 
increases directors. Variable age of directors 
(AGE), a postgraduate degree (MBA), and a man 
of directors (Tenure) did not show the same results 
in previous studies loyeung (2014). This does not 
indicate that employers give more compensation 
increases based on the qualifications of directors 
accounting (CPA), a postgraduate degree (MBA), 
the age of the directors (Age), and a man of 
directors (Tenure). It does not agree with the 
previous literature that says that their accounting 
qualification (CPA) can reduce the concerns of 
shareholders in managing companies (Sun, 2015). 
Moreover, it proves that in Indonesia the change 
does not affect the company's financial standards in 
selecting directors with financial expertise better. This 
is in line with research Guner (2008) who found that 
the compensation of directors is not a significant 
increase to the directors who have financial expertise. 
With the change of financial standards will put new 
pressure on the directors in the financial report and 
implement internal control. However, it is not proven 
in this study.  
Agency theory explains that the principal and 
agent have different interests in menjelankan 
company. With the contract is expected to 
memotivator agent intensive work harder and reduce 
the interest difference. However, in this study it is not 
proven by the practitioner. Principals do not provide a 
boost in the form of increase in compensation to his 
agent at the time of the change of the financial 
standards that require understanding and relearning by 
the agency in preparing the financial statements and 
internal control.  
Lack of encouragement in the form of 
increase in compensation from the principal to the 
agent can be caused by several things. First thing, 
this could be due to the turn-based financial 
standards of SFAS SFAS GAAP into IFRS based 
pelapran less an impact on the company's financial 
and management control of the company. Second, 
in the absence of intensive labor contracts that 
provide bonuses such as cash or stock. This will 
cause a misalignment of interest between the 
agency with the interests of the company. 
 
Third Hypothesis Testing Results (H3)  
The third hypothesis in this study is the financial 
expertise of directors negatively affect the change of 
directors during the year of IFRS adoption.  
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Table 5 Results of regression test a third hypothesis   
  Dependent Variable = Change of Directors of the Year 2012  
      
variables  Regression coefficient Sig 
 
 
    
constants -3234  0552 
AGE_t -0012   0841 
TENURE_t -0046  0482 
CPA_t 2,487  0539 
MBA_t -2499  0068 
size_t 0160  0400 
pseudo R2    0128 
Onimbus Test    0402 
      
Observation    51   
Source: Data Olah SPSS 17.0  
Based on Table 5 the results of multiple regression 
test hypotheses Third, the magnitude of Pseudo R2 
value of 0.128 which means that the variability of the 
variable change of directors in 2012 can be explained 
by 12.8% by the age variable directors, past the man 
of directors, the accounting profession degree (CPA), 
and the title graduate (MBA) directors in 2012. the 
remaining 87.2% is explained by other variables not 
included in the regression model. 
0.160 SIZE + ɛ 
 
constants  for  -3.234  stated  that  if  the 
independent variables held constant, the change of 
directors has a value of -3.234 one unit. CPA 
regression coefficient 2.487, which means turnover 
worth directors will be increased by 12.025 (e2,487) 
 times for each unit increase in directors accounting 
 certification (CPA) than companies that did not 
 experience the change of directors if other variables 
  Under the influence of the test simultaneously held constant. MBA worth the regression coefficient 
(Onimbus test) was obtained at 0.402 regression -2.499, which means the change of directors will 
sinifikansi value greater than 0.05, which means that increase by 0.082 (e-2.499) times for each unit 
the independent variable age of directors (AGE_ti), reduction directors post-graduate degree (MBA) 
past the man of directors (TENURE_ti), the title of than companies that did not experience the change 
the accounting profession (CPA_ti), and a post- of directors if other variables held constant. 
graduate degree ( MBA_ti) simultaneously together Regression coefficient tenure worth -0.046, 
does  not  affect  the  turnover  variable  directors which means the change of directors will increase by 
(ΔTURNOVER).  The  third  hypothesis  is  not 0.955 (e-0.046) times for each unit decrease in time 
supported,  which  means  financial  expertise  of servant of directors (Tenure) than companies that did 
directors (financial expertise) should not adversely not experience the change of directors if other 
affect the turn of the directors during the year of variables held constant. Age regression coefficient of 
IFRS adoption. directors (Age) worth -0.012, which means the 
  Moreover, the significance of each independent change of directors will increase by 0.988 (e-0.012) 
variable age of directors amounted to 0.841, a period times for each unit decrease in the age of the 
of  directors  servant  0.482,  0.539  accountants directors  (Age)  than  companies  that  did  not 
professional degree and post-graduate degree 0.068 experience the change of directors if other variables 
showed significantly greater value than the value of held constant. Regression coefficient of firm size 
0.05% significance test. So that the results showed (Size) worth 0.160 which means the change of 
no significant effect of variable financial expertise of directors will be increased by 1,173 (e0,160) times 
directors to replace any directors at year's adoption for each unit increase in firm size (Size) than 
of IFRS. companies that did not experience the change of 
  Based on the results of logit regression test directors if other variables held constant. 
output can be concluded with a third hypothesis Control variables company size also showed no 
regression equation as follows: significant effect in predicting the turnover variable 
   directors. This is in contrast from previous studies 
ΔTURNOVER = -3.234 + 2.487 CPA - 2,499 MBA (Loyeung, 2014). Zhao (2016) find a company that 
  - 0,046 TENURE - 0.012 AGE + does the reporting back to prefer hiring directors 
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 who have accounting qualifications both in terms of 
experience and knowledge of accounting. The 
results of this study do not prove it.  
Bhagat (2010) found that the financial 
expertise berepengaruh no significant play an 
important role in the decision to replace the 
company's directors. This study also found no 
significant effect of financial expertise of directors 
to replace any directors at the time of the adoption 
of IFRS penih. In the implementation, the company 
would seek to memepekerjaan director with 
accounting experience and qualifications better than 
the previous one. However, the results of this study 
contrasts with that. This may be caused by at least a 
sample of firms in this study as well as research 
time using only two years of research. Moreover, it 
proves that in Indonesia the change does not affect 
the company's financial standards in selecting 
directors with financial expertise better. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS  
This study provides evidence of the effect of 
financial expertise of directors related to the 
compensation of directors and change of directors 
in non-financial companies in Indonesia in 2011 
through 2012. This study used four variables to 
define financial expertise is accounting certification 
(CPA), a postgraduate degree (MBA) , age 
directors (aGE), past the man of directors 
(TENURE). There are several conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study. First, there are no 
positive effect of financial expertise of directors in 
Indonesia. Second, there is a positive effect of 
financial expertise of directors to the increase in the 
compensation of directors. Third, there are no 
negative influence between financial expertise of 
directors to replace any directors in Indonesia.  
Control variables associated company size 
significantly to the compensation of directors and 
compensation increases. This explains the larger the 
company the greater the rise in compensation and 
compensation can be awarded. However, the age 
variable directors, servants past directors, directors 
of certification and post-graduate degree directors 
failed to define the effect of financial expertise to 
compensation and replacement of directors. This 
may be caused because the low variability of the 
four variables financial expertise in explaining the 
dependent variable. This proves the change does 
not affect the standard of financial reporting and 
management control in non-financial companies in 
Indonesia.  
Moreover in practice the company would 
choose directors who have expertise and 
understanding of accounting, so the owner of the 
company can be more confident in delegating 
authority to the directors. And the company will 
provide compensation and bonuses in intensive 
employment contract as a form of dorangan for an 
 
agent to work harder. However, in practice the lack 
of educational background of directors holds a CPA 
and MBA, as well as the limitations of working life 
and also the life of the directors in the employment 
contract to make variable the CPA, MBA, age 
directors and a man of directors less into the right 
variables in measuring financial expertise of 
directors in Indonesia.  
This study has several different limitations. First, 
this study uses only two years of research, namely 
2011 and 2012. As well as limited the sample to non-
financial companies in Indonesia. Researchers 
speculate that the small study led to a lack of 
representativeness of the sample to test the hypothesis. 
Second, the study only used as a control variable sized 
companies while there are many other variables such 
as the complexity of the work, the size of the board of 
directors, the value of stock returns, and others that 
can be a supporter of research related to the 
compensation of directors. The study only examined 
the overall board of directors related to the variables 
measured using proportions.  
Based on research that has been done on these 
results suggest for the company to hire directors who 
have belekang educational background in business 
and have accounting certification (CPA). In addition, 
the company may consider the compensation and 
compensation increase through time servant of 
directors, directors age, and educational background 
as an MBA and CPA directors owned by members of 
the board of directors. For education, this research 
may be relevant literature and adds to evidence of 
financial expertise, compensation, and a change of 
directors in Indonesia.  
Suggestions for further research are expected to 
increase the scope of the sample in terms of years 
and also studied industrial sector. Further research 
is also expected to add variables related to financial 
expertise for R-square test is obtained by a fairly 
small variability in explaining financial expertise to 
compensation and replacement of directors. In 
addition, further research can also be specifying the 
object of study of the board of directors became 
managing director or finance director.  
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